Arbeitspapier

R&D networks: Theory, empirics and policy implications

We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We also identify the key firms, i.e. the firms whose exit would reduce welfare the most. We then structurally estimate our model using a panel dataset of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to identify the key firms and analyze the impact of R&D subsidy programs. Moreover, we analyze temporal changes in the rankings of key firms and how these changes affect the optimal R&D policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 142

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing
Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
Thema
R&D networks
key firms
optimal subsidies
Industrieforschung
Forschungskooperation
Unternehmensnetzwerk
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Forschungsfinanzierung
Wohlfahrtsanalyse
Theorie
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
König, Michael D.
Liu, Xiaodong
Zenou, Yves
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.5167/uzh-93904
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • König, Michael D.
  • Liu, Xiaodong
  • Zenou, Yves
  • University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2014

Ähnliche Objekte (12)