Endogenous Mergers in Concentrated Markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper proposes an approach for predicting the pattern of mergers when different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative game theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, mergers are conductive to market structures with large industry profits, and thus points to a conflict between private and social incentives. It is shown how mergers may be undertaken in order to preempt other possible, and socially more desirable, mergers. The model also throws light on the formation of research joint ventures and tariff-jumping foreign direct investment.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 513

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Thema: Endogenous mergers ; coalition formation ; Fusion ; Unternehmenskonzentration ; Industrieökonomik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Persson, Lars ; Horn, Henrik
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 1998

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95120
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ