Irreversible investments, dynamic inconsistency and policy convergence

Arbeitspapier

We study a model where two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the near future and the outcome is uncertain. Prior to the election, the members of both parties nominate their prime ministerial candidates. Investors care about the outcome since they may invest in irreversible domestic production capital. We find that there is political convergence in the nomination process. In some circumstances, it is only the median voter of the left-wing party that elects a more moderate candidate. In other instances, the members of both parties nominate more “conservative” candidates, but there is still convergence. We also show that a higher probability of the left winning the election increases the degree of convergence, while a more globalised economy (greater capital mobility) reduces it.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1910

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes ; Capitalist Systems: Political Economy
• Subject: Wahlverhalten ; Investition ; Politische Partei ; Politisches Ziel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hagen, Rune Jansen ; Torsvik, Gaute
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25955
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET