Arbeitspapier

Nash's interpretations of equilibrium: Solving the objections to Cournot

A Nash equilibrium can also be seen as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, though this is debated because Cournot provided a specific application, not a general formulation. In my view, another of Nash's fundamental contributions stands out when contrasting him to Cournot. Cournot treated economic decisions as optimization problems, but his stability analysis of duopoly led to endless discussions because players did not use the available information. Nash solves this with his rational interpretation: when players know the structure of the game, they can use the solution to predict the equilibrium. He thus introduces rational expectations. Nash additionally offers an adaptive interpretation: when players do not know the structure of the game, they can adjust their strategies to maximize payoffs. These adaptive expectations were anticipated by Cournot in his analysis of monopoly. In brief, Nash was not only extraordinary as a mathematician; his deep insights allow solving decades-long debates in economics.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 575

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
equilibrium
rational players
consistent beliefs
adaptive expectations
rational expectations

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Streb, Jorge M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
(wo)
Buenos Aires
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Streb, Jorge M.
  • Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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