Arbeitspapier
Unions and Firms' Investments: A Unified View
In this paper, we present a simple model in which a unionized and non-unionized firm optimally make investment decisions given their labor productivity. By allowing workers' organizations to have positive effects on labor effort, we find that the classic hold-up problem does not necessarily survive. We also derive conditions under which rent-seeking by unions may actually encourage firms' investments.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12515
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Thema
-
labor unions
rent seeking
workers' effort
firms' investments
hold-up
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Berton, Fabio
Dughera, Stefano
Ricci, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Berton, Fabio
- Dughera, Stefano
- Ricci, Andrea
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2019