Arbeitspapier

Unions and Firms' Investments: A Unified View

In this paper, we present a simple model in which a unionized and non-unionized firm optimally make investment decisions given their labor productivity. By allowing workers' organizations to have positive effects on labor effort, we find that the classic hold-up problem does not necessarily survive. We also derive conditions under which rent-seeking by unions may actually encourage firms' investments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12515

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
labor unions
rent seeking
workers' effort
firms' investments
hold-up

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Berton, Fabio
Dughera, Stefano
Ricci, Andrea
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Berton, Fabio
  • Dughera, Stefano
  • Ricci, Andrea
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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