Arbeitspapier
Improving Public Good Supply and Income Equality: Facing a Trade-Off
It is explored in this paper how – depending on the agents’ preferences – an unequal income distribution may lead to a higher public good supply in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium than in a cooperative Lindahl equilibrium that arises from a balanced income distribution. The degree of inequality that is needed for producing this result may be moderate what in particular is shown through an example with CES preferences.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8786
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Public Goods
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
- Thema
-
public good
Nash equilibrium
Lindahl equilibrium
income distribution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Rübbelke, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Buchholz, Wolfgang
- Rübbelke, Dirk
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2020