Executive board composition and bank risk taking

Arbeitspapier

Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives. In contrast, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 978-3-86558-795-4
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 03/2012

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Analysis of Education ; Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
• Thema: Banks ; executives ; risk taking ; age ; gender ; education ; Bankmanager ; Führungskräfte ; Risikopräferenz ; Bankrisiko ; Schätzung ; Deutschland

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Berger, Allen N. ; Kick, Thomas ; Schaeck, Klaus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsche Bundesbank
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56024
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ