Information independence and common knowledge

Arbeitspapier

In Bayesian environments with private information, as described by the types of Harsanyi, how can types of agents be (statistically) disassociated from each other and how are such disassociations reflected in the agents' knowledge structure? Conditions studied are (i) subjective independence (the opponents' types are independent conditional on one's own) and (ii) type disassociation under common knowledge (the agents' types are independent, conditional on some common-knowledge variable). Subjective independence is motivated by its implications in Bayesian games and in studies of equilibrium concepts. We find that a variable that disassociates types is more informative than any common-knowledge variable. With three or more agents, conditions (i) and (ii) are equivalent. They also imply that any variable which is common knowledge to two agents is common knowledge to all, and imply the existence of a unique common-knowledge variable that disassociates types, which is the one defined by Aumann.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1476

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
• Thema: Bayesian games ; independent types ; common knowledge ; Bayes-Statistik ; Asymmetrische Information ; Informationsökonomik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gossner, Olivier ; Kalai, Ehud ; Weber, Robert
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59640
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ