Arbeitspapier

Trigger Strategies and the Cyclicality of Markups

An environment capable of generating both counter- and procyclical movements in markups through the interaction of opposing factors is considered. This framework can account for observed variations in the cyclical behavior of markups across industries. Technology shocks and endogenous labor supply are introduced into a model with implicit collusion and periodic reversion to non-collusive behavior. Within either a collusive or non-collusive regime, markups are positively correlated with output. Switches between regimes, however, result in opposing movements in markups and output, reducing the overall correlation of the two series. Our findings imply that weak cyclicality of markups is not inconsistent with a large role for changes in market power in accounting for cyclical fluctuations. Offsetting effects may make the overall correlation of the markup with output low, while still allowing for the instability of the cartel to have important cyclical implications.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 911

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Thema
markups
oligopoly
trigger strategies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Head, Allen
Lapham, Beverly
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1994

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Head, Allen
  • Lapham, Beverly
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1994

Ähnliche Objekte (12)