Arbeitspapier
A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers
We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2008-11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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common pool resources
collective tax
framed field experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Reichhuber, Anke
Camacho Cuena, Eva
Requate, Till
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Kiel University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kiel
- (when)
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2008
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Reichhuber, Anke
- Camacho Cuena, Eva
- Requate, Till
- Kiel University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008