Arbeitspapier

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2008-11

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
common pool resources
collective tax
framed field experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Reichhuber, Anke
Camacho Cuena, Eva
Requate, Till
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Reichhuber, Anke
  • Camacho Cuena, Eva
  • Requate, Till
  • Kiel University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2008

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