Arbeitspapier

A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian Farmers

We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to overharvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects? decisions during the treatments.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2008-11

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
common pool resources
collective tax
framed field experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Reichhuber, Anke
Camacho Cuena, Eva
Requate, Till
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Kiel University, Department of Economics
(where)
Kiel
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Reichhuber, Anke
  • Camacho Cuena, Eva
  • Requate, Till
  • Kiel University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2008

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