Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore)

Arbeitspapier

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they decrease this probability in offshore-rich countries. We use a simple model of conflict to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil windfalls increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6346

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts ; Hydrocarbon Resources
• Subject: natural resources ; conflict

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Andersen, Jørgen Juel ; Nordvik, Frode Martin ; Tesei, Andrea
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155588
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET