Oil and Civil Conflict: On and Off (Shore)

Arbeitspapier

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they decrease this probability in offshore-rich countries. We use a simple model of conflict to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil windfalls increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6346

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts ; Hydrocarbon Resources
• Thema: natural resources ; conflict

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Andersen, Jørgen Juel ; Nordvik, Frode Martin ; Tesei, Andrea
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155588
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ