Household Savings and Marriage Payments: Evidence from Dowry in India

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines how traditional marriage market institutions affect households' financial decisions. We study how bride-to-groom marriage payments, i.e., dowries, influence saving behavior in rural India. Exploiting variation in firstborn gender and heterogeneity in dowry amounts across marriage markets, we find that the prospect of paying higher dowry increases household savings, which are primarily financed through increased paternal labor supply. This is the first paper that highlights this alternative motive for savings in dowry-paying societies. However, we find no impacts of dowry expectations on son-preferring fertility behaviors and investments in girls.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 11464

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Household Saving; Personal Finance ; Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• Subject: household savings ; dowry ; marriage payments ; India ; labor supply ; fertility ; sex ratio ; child investments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Anukriti, S ; Kwon, Sungoh ; Prakash, Nishith
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180482
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET