Arbeitspapier

Money and banking with reserves and CBDC

We analyze retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) in a two-tier monetary system with bank deposit market power and externalities from liquidity transformation. Resource costs of liquidity provision determine the optimal monetary architecture and modified Friedman (1969) rules the optimal monetary policy. Optimal interest rates on reserves and CBDC differ. A calibration for the U.S. suggests a weak case for CBDC in the baseline but a much clearer case when too-big-to-fail banks, tax distortions or instrument restrictions are present. Depending on central bank choices CBDC raises U.S. bank funding costs by up to 1.5 percent of GDP.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 22-12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
Monetary Policy
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Central bank digital currency
reserves
two-tier system
bank
liquidity
equivalence

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Niepelt, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bern, Department of Economics
(wo)
Bern
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Niepelt, Dirk
  • University of Bern, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2022

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