A market for connections

Arbeitspapier

Government or company decisions on whom to hire are mostly delegated to politicians, public sector officials or human resources and procurement managers. Due to anti-corruption laws, agents cannot sell contracts or positions that they are delegated to decide upon. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the spoils may invest in a good relationship with the deciding agents in order to be remembered when the nomination is made. In this paper, we analyze such markets for connections in the presence of convex costs of networking.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3810

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Incomplete Markets ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Network Formation and Analysis: Theory ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Subject: nominations ; rent-seeking ; networks ; politicians ; procurement

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Miettinen, Topi ; Poutvaara, Panu
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2012

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57955
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET