Arbeitspapier

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada's (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 67.2015

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
Coalitional Bargaining
Nash Program
Simultaneous Payoff
Demands
Uncertainty

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nieva, Ricardo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nieva, Ricardo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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