The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Arbeitspapier

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can form if an only if payoff demands are feasible as in the Nash (1953) demand game. After smoothing the game (as in Van Damme (1991)), when the noise vanishes, when the discount factor is close to 1, and as in Okada's (2011), the coalitional Nash bargaining solution is the unique stationary subgameperfect equilibrium.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 67.2015

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: Coalitional Bargaining ; Nash Program ; Simultaneous Payoff ; Demands ; Uncertainty

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nieva, Ricardo
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/113967
• Last update: 12.03.2025, 6:08 AM CET