Abused rebels and winning coalitions: Regime change under the pressure of rebellions

Arbeitspapier

We hypothesize that, in certain regime types, winning coalitions have an incentive for helping a deprived population solving the collective action problem that may otherwise restrain them in revolting against an incumbent. Recent selectorate literature holds that members of a winning coalition may find themselves in a loyalty trap after having realized a bad character of an incumbent. According to our hypothesis, the winning coalition's members can find a way out of the loyalty trap by influencing expectations within the population in a way as to spark a public rebellion. A thus induced rebellion raises the chance of each of the winning coalition's members for preserving their position in a newly formed winning coalition following a regime change. Hence, the very regime structure that makes a loyalty trap more probably is identical to a regime structure under which we should expect a higher vulnerability to public rebellions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CIW Discussion Paper ; No. 1/2015

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Apolte, Thomas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Interdisziplinäre Wirtschaftsforschung (CIW)
• (where): Münster
• (when): 2015

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107670
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET