Arbeitspapier
A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Existence of Linear Equilibria in the Kyle-Model
The existence of a linear equilibrium in Kyle's model of market making with multiple, symmetrically informed strategic traders is implied for any number of strategic traders if the joint distribution of the underlying exogenous random variables is elliptical. The reverse implication has been shown for the case in which the random variables are independent and have finite second moments. Here we extend this result to the case in which the underlying random variables are not necessarily independent and their joint distribution is determined by its moments.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 43
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Market Microstructure
Kyle Model
Linear
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nöldeke, Georg
Tröger, Thomas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2005
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13505
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13505-4
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nöldeke, Georg
- Tröger, Thomas
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2005
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