Arbeitspapier

Corruption and its alternatives: A takeoff theory of good governance

Corruption is a function of its return relative to engaging in productive activities. This paper presents an approach for thinking about the institutional features of societies and the resulting amount of corruption. The empirical results suggest that political competition is more important than competition in information-producing industries. The rent-seeking view of the relation between government and corruption is rejected in favor of the Becker (1983) model of political competition. The paper suggests that societies that continually stay open to productivity-enhancing activities will eventually enter a takeoff stage of anti-corruption efforts analogous to the eventual improvement in income distribution that occurs in successful industrialization.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 604

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Korruption
Neue politische Ökonomie
Theorie
Technischer Fortschritt
Good Governance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Osborne, Evan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Osborne, Evan
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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