Arbeitspapier

Too good to be true? How time-inconsistent renewable energy policies can deter investments

The transition towards low-carbon economies requires massive investments into renewable energies, which are commonly supported through regulatory frameworks. Yet, governments can have incentives - and the ability - to deviate from previously-announced support once those investments have been made, which can deter investments. We analyze a renewable energy regulation game, apply a model of time-inconsistency to renewable energy policy and derive under what conditions governments have incentives to deviate from their commitments. We analyze the effects of various support policies and deployment targets and explain why Spain conducted retrospective changes in the period 2010-2013 whereas Germany stuck to its commitments.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1726

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Alternative Energy Sources
Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
Technological Change: Government Policy
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
Time-Inconsistency
Regulation
Targets
Renewable Energy Policy
Investments

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
May, Nils
Chiappinelli, Olga
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • May, Nils
  • Chiappinelli, Olga
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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