Arbeitspapier

On the private provision of public goods on networks

This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium with general best-reply functions. Our uniqueness result simultaneously extends similar results in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) on the private provision of public goods to networks and Bramoullé, Kranton, and D'Amours (2011) on games of strategic substitutes to nonlinear best-reply functions. In addition, we investigate the neutrality result of Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) whereby consumers are able to offset income redistributions and tax-financed government contributions. To this effect, we establish that the neutrality result has a limited scope of application beyond regular networks.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 689

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Public Goods
Subject
Public goods
Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
Network games
Neutrality
Bonacich centrality
Main eigenvalue

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Allouch, Nizar
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
(where)
London
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Allouch, Nizar
  • Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Time of origin

  • 2012

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