Arbeitspapier
Unionization Structure, Licensing and Innovation
Taking technological differences between firms as given, we show that the technologically advanced firm has a stronger incentive for technology licensing under a decentralized unionization structure than with centralized wage setting. Furthermore, We show that, in presence of licensing, the incentive for innovation may also be stronger under decentralized unions. Unions have a clear preference for centralization only if productivity improvements are relatively small.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-109/4
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
- Subject
-
Licensing
downstream market
upstream market
innovation
welfare
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Mukherjee, Arijit
Pennings, Enrico
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mukherjee, Arijit
- Pennings, Enrico
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2005
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