Arbeitspapier
On the Optimal Size of Public Sector under Rent-Seeking competition from State Coffers
This paper incorporates competition for fiscal transfers (or, equivalently, rent seeking from state coffers) into a standard general equilibrium model of economic growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy. The government generates tax revenues, but then each selfinterested individual agent tries to extract, for his own personal benefit, a fraction of these revenues. Extracted tax revenues could alternatively be used to finance economy-wide infrastructure. We look at a Nash equilibrium in individual agents' behavior, and then investigate what the society should do to discourage rent-seeking competition. The focus is on the optimal size of public sector.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 991
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
social conflict
fiscal policy
economic growth
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Park, Hyun
Philippopoulos, Apostolis
Vassilatos, Vangelis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Park, Hyun
- Philippopoulos, Apostolis
- Vassilatos, Vangelis
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2003
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