Unordnung in der Internationalen Handelsordnung: Befunde, Gründe, Auswirkungen und Therapien

Arbeitspapier

In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to bind them. This paper analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality argument, the tying hand argument, that is to protect a government which is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets. For all three arguments, it is shown why an important driving force of mercantilistically motivated trade negotiations has become weaker, the reciprocity requirement. The paper recommends narrower negotiation issues and mandates to prevent a further rising heterogeneity of issues and negotiation partners.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Deutsch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1533

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Thema: International Trading Order ; Multilateral Trading Negotiations ; Reciprocity ; Internationale Handelspolitik ; Außenhandelspolitik ; Public Choice ; Verhandlungen ; Reziprozität (Verhaltensökonomik) ; Außenhandelsliberalisierung ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Langhammer, Rolf J.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28366
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ