Arbeitspapier

Social Capital and the Status Externality

This paper investigates how the presence of social capital affects the externality arising from status-seeking preference as a parable for inefficient antagonistic behavior. It is assumed that the stock of social capital is accumulating through joint social interaction between rational individuals who are forward looking. Using a differential game, we show that although the presence of social capital mitigates the tendency of overconsumption over time, social capital ends up declining to zero. It is also shown that the benefits from social capital enhance the motivation of individuals to accumulate social capital thereby leading to deter overaccumulation and thus possibly improving social welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6820

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity: General
Resource Booms
Thema
social capital
status externality
Markov perfect
equilibrium
differential game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Itaya, Jun-ichi
Tsoukis, Christopher
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Itaya, Jun-ichi
  • Tsoukis, Christopher
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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