Arbeitspapier

International Protection of Intellectual Property

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 790

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
patents
intellectual property
harmonization
TRIPs.

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grossman, Gene M.
Lai, Edwin L.-C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grossman, Gene M.
  • Lai, Edwin L.-C.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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