The Discursive Dilemma in Monetary Policy

Arbeitspapier

The discursive dilemma implies that the policy decision of a board of policymakers depends on whether the board reaches the decision by voting directly on policy (conclusion-based procedure), or by voting on the premises for the decision (premise-based procedure). We derive results showing when the discursive dilemma may occur, both in a general model and in a standard monetary policy model. When the board aggregates by majority voting, a discursive dilemma can occur if either (i) the relationship between the premise and the decision is non-monotonic, or (ii) if the board members have different judgments on at least two of the premises. Normatively, a premise-based procedure tends to give better decisions when there is disagreement on parameters of the model.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-82-7553-551-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2010/05

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Claussen, Carl Andreas ; Røisland, Øistein
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Norges Bank
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209950
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET