Arbeitspapier

Voluntary industry standards: An experimental investigation of a Greek gift

One reason for firms to voluntarily increase their environmental or social production standards is to prevent consumers from lobbying for stricter mandatory standards. In this sense, voluntary overcompliance serves as a Greek gift, as consumers might be worse off in the end. Strategically, a Greek gift deteriorates the consumer's incentive for lobbying and, as such, might be unkind. In many experiments it was shown that unkind actions which decrease the other's payoff are punished by negative reciprocal behavior. This paper experimentally investigates whether negative reciprocity can also be observed if unkind behavior is not directed at payoffs but rather at a deterioration of strategic incentives.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2015-206

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Subject
experiments
voluntary agreements
overcompliance
learning
reciprocity

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmid, Julia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmid, Julia
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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