Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis

Arbeitspapier

This paper has a dual purpose. First, I present a new modeling of partial naivete, and apply this to the analysis of procrastination. The decision maker is assumed to have stationary behavior and to be partially naive in the sense of perceiving that his current preferences may persist in the future. The behavioral implications of such partial naivete differ from those of related literature. Second, I suggest a general principle for welfare analysis in multi-self settings through a new application of Pareto-dominance, which is motivated by the existence of time-inconsistency and coincides with dominance relations used elsewhere in game theory. In the case of procrastination, it leads to a clear welfare conclusion: Being partially naive reduces welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2007,02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Consumer Economics: Theory ; Welfare Economics: General ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡ ; Macroeconomics: Consumption; Saving; Wealth
• Subject: Procrastination ; partial naivete ; time-inconsistency ; game theory ; behavioral welfare economics ; Verhaltensökonomik ; Entscheidungstheorie ; Zeitkonsistenz ; Zeitökonomik ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Asheim, Geir B.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62970
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET