Arbeitspapier
A Theory of Procedurally Rational Choice: Optimization without Evaluation
This paper analyses the behavior of an individual who wants to maximize his utility function, but he is not able to evaluate it. There are many ways to choose a single alternative from a given set. We show that a unique utility maximizing procedure exists. Choices induced by this optimal procedure are always transitive but generally violate the Weak Axiom. In other words, utility maximizing individuals who are unable to evaluate their objective functions fail to exhibit rational revealed preferences.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 06-001/1
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Subject
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Bounded rationality
optimal selection procedure
procedural rationality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ficco, Stefano
Karamychev, Vladimir
van Reeven, Peran
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ficco, Stefano
- Karamychev, Vladimir
- van Reeven, Peran
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2006
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