Arbeitspapier

Financial stability: To regulate or not? A public choice inquiry

The paper takes the stand that the central banks as financial regulators have their own interest in imposing more regulations. It models the institutional behaviour for the central bank and government using the Indirect Inference testing and estimation method as it finds a set of coefficients of the model that can generate the actual observed behaviour for the US. The paper establishes that good monetary policy can reduce instability. Regulation at worse destabilises the economy and at best contributes little to stabilise the economy. After the financial crisis, financial regulations were too severe and thus actually increased instability.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2018/4

Classification
Wirtschaft
General Aggregative Models: General
Central Banks and Their Policies
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
DSGE
Regulations
Financial Stability
Monetary Policy

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Le, Vo Phuong Mai
Meenagh, David
Minford, Patrick
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(where)
Cardiff
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Le, Vo Phuong Mai
  • Meenagh, David
  • Minford, Patrick
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Time of origin

  • 2018

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