Risks at work: the demand and supply sides of government redistribution

Arbeitspapier

To understand how the welfare state adjusts to economic shocks it is important to explain both the genesis of popular preferences and the institutional incentives of governments to respond to these preferences. This paper attempts to do both, using a general theoretical framework and detailed data at both the individual and national levels. In a first step, we focus on how risk exposure and income are related to preferences for redistribution. To test our hypotheses, we extract detailed risk exposure measures from labor force surveys and marry them to cross-national survey data. In a second step, we turn our attention to the supply side of government redistribution. Institutions, we argue, mediate governments’ reactions to redistributional demands following economic shocks. Using time-series cross-country data, we demonstrate how national training systems, electoral institutions as well as government partisanship shape government responses.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2005-15

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
• Thema: Public Opinion ; Preferences ; Redistribution ; Varieties of Capitalism ; Partisanship ; Unemployment ; Occupations

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cusack, Thomas R. ; Iversen, Torben ; Rehm, Philipp
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51229