Arbeitspapier

The Detrimental Effect of Job Protection on Employment: Evidence from France

According to French law, employers have to pay at least six months salary to employees whose seniority exceeds two years in case of unfair dismissal. We show, relying on data, that this regulation entails a hike in severance payments at two-year seniority which induces a significant rise in the job separation rate before the two-year threshold and a drop just after. The layoff costs and its procedural component are evaluated thanks to the estimation of a search and matching model which reproduces the shape of the job separation rate. We find that total layoff costs increase with seniority and are about four times higher than the expected severance payments at two years of seniority. Counterfactual exercises show that the fragility of low-seniority jobs implies that layoff costs reduce the average job duration and increase unemployment for a wide set of empirically relevant parameters.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12384

Classification
Wirtschaft
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
Subject
employment protection legislation
dismissal costs
unemployment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cahuc, Pierre
Malherbet, Franck
Prat, Julien
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cahuc, Pierre
  • Malherbet, Franck
  • Prat, Julien
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2019

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