Divided boards: Partisanship through delegated monetary policy

Arbeitspapier

While monetary policy decisions are mainly taken by Committees (as is the case for the ECB, or for the Federal Reserve), the literature largely stands on the …ction of a single central banker, be it (or not) a conservative one. The purpose here is to consider explicitly the plural dimension of monetary policy Boards, and to investigate the consequences of such a decision structure for monetary policy rules.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEI Working Paper ; No. B 01-2001

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General ; Central Banks and Their Policies
• Subject: Partisan Theory ; Policy Boards ; Monetary Union ; Zentralbank ; Geldpolitik ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Public Choice ; Politische Partei ; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Farvaque, Etienne ; Lagadec, Gaël
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39646
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET