Artikel

The welfare cost of signaling

Might the resource costliness of making signals credible be low or negligible? Using a job market as an example, we build a signaling model to determine the extent to which a transfer from an applicant might replace a resource cost as an equilibrium method of achieving signal credibility. Should a firm's announcement of hiring for an open position be believed, the firm has an incentive to use a properly-calibrated fee to implement a separating equilibrium. The result is robust to institutional changes, outside options, many firms or many applicants and applicant risk aversion, though a sufficiently risk-averse applicant who is sufficiently likely to be a high type may lead to a preference for a pooling equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-21 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
costly signaling
social cost of signaling
asymmetric information
separating equilibrium

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Yang, Fan
Harstad, Ronald M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3390/g8010011
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Yang, Fan
  • Harstad, Ronald M.
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2017

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