Artikel

The welfare cost of signaling

Might the resource costliness of making signals credible be low or negligible? Using a job market as an example, we build a signaling model to determine the extent to which a transfer from an applicant might replace a resource cost as an equilibrium method of achieving signal credibility. Should a firm's announcement of hiring for an open position be believed, the firm has an incentive to use a properly-calibrated fee to implement a separating equilibrium. The result is robust to institutional changes, outside options, many firms or many applicants and applicant risk aversion, though a sufficiently risk-averse applicant who is sufficiently likely to be a high type may lead to a preference for a pooling equilibrium.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-21 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
costly signaling
social cost of signaling
asymmetric information
separating equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Yang, Fan
Harstad, Ronald M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.3390/g8010011
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Yang, Fan
  • Harstad, Ronald M.
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2017

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