Artikel
The welfare cost of signaling
Might the resource costliness of making signals credible be low or negligible? Using a job market as an example, we build a signaling model to determine the extent to which a transfer from an applicant might replace a resource cost as an equilibrium method of achieving signal credibility. Should a firm's announcement of hiring for an open position be believed, the firm has an incentive to use a properly-calibrated fee to implement a separating equilibrium. The result is robust to institutional changes, outside options, many firms or many applicants and applicant risk aversion, though a sufficiently risk-averse applicant who is sufficiently likely to be a high type may lead to a preference for a pooling equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 8 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-21 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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costly signaling
social cost of signaling
asymmetric information
separating equilibrium
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Yang, Fan
Harstad, Ronald M.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g8010011
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Yang, Fan
- Harstad, Ronald M.
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2017