Arbeitspapier

Why are IPOs underpriced? Evidence from Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings

Until October 1997, firms wishing to go public in Japan were required to use a hybrid auction process where up to half of the issue (the auction tranche) was offered to investors via a discriminatory auction. Remaining shares (the public offer tranche) were sold a few days later by a firm commitment at a fixed price. We document underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO public offer prices in Japan's auction regime, a regime where: investors are symmetrically informed or information differences are not important; roadshows are not held; preferential allocations to any investor are negligible; and institutional investing is low. The results raise important questions about theoretical interpretations of IPO underpricing in the U.S. We consider a broad range of competing, but non-mutually-exclusive, hypotheses about the reasons for underpricing and partial adjustment. Japan's auction-method evidence is most consistent with a quasicontractual allocation of risk related to initial mispricing. The risk allocation hypothesis is that, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price to the issuer, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The underwriter benefits from underpricing because underpriced IPOs are easier to place and because the underwriter can allocate small positions in the underpriced shares to preferred customers in implicit exchange for other benefits. As average underpricing in our sample is about three times as great as the underwriter's fee, and as some IPOs are severely underpriced, we cannot exclude the possibility that underpricing is affected by agency cost and prospect theory considerations similar to those suggested by Ritter and Welch (2002) in their review of the U.S. IPO market.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers ; No. 2005-03

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Financial Markets
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Subject
IPO
public offering
book building
underpricing
partial adjustment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kerins, Frank
Kutsuna, Kenji
Smith, Richard L.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
(where)
Claremont, CA
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kerins, Frank
  • Kutsuna, Kenji
  • Smith, Richard L.
  • Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2005

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