Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation

Arbeitspapier

We model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile{to{mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, `collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 500

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Telecommunications
• Subject: telecommunication ; mobile phones ; mobile-to-mobile access charges ; network effects

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Baake, Pio ; Mitusch, Kay
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18351
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET