Arbeitspapier

Granular Search, Market Structure, and Wages

We build a model where firm size is a source of labor market power. The key mechanism is that a granular employer can eliminate its own vacancies from a worker's outside option in the wage bargain. Hence, a granular employer does not compete with itself. We show how wages depend on employment concentration and then use the model to quantify the effects of granular market power. In Austrian micro-data, we find that granular market power depresses wages by about ten percent and can explain 40 percent of the observed decline in the labor share from 1997 to 2015. Mergers decrease competition for workers and reduce wages even at non-merging firms.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12574

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Thema
market power
labor share
search and matching

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jarosch, Gregor
Nimczik, Jan Sebastian
Sorkin, Isaac
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jarosch, Gregor
  • Nimczik, Jan Sebastian
  • Sorkin, Isaac
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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