Arbeitspapier

Endogenous noise traders

We construct a parsimonious model of a financial market where the marginal investor is an endogenous noise trader. Such a trader anticipates that future shocks may force him to exit his position. In compensation he requires a higher return. We show that the original seller of the asset pays the required return. This can only be optimal if the seller has access to an investment opportunity that gives a sufficiently high return, compared to the noise trader's investment opportunities. We also show that, if the noise trader expects to get informative signals, the required return does not necessarily decrease, as claimed in the earlier literature.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 644

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Thema
Market microstructure
no-trade theorems
adverse selection
Finanzmarkt
Kapitalanlage
Noise Trading
Adverse Selection

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Salomonsson, Marcus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Salomonsson, Marcus
  • Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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