Arbeitspapier

Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

This paper explores how the introduction of an experience rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that, despite the higher costs of layoffs, the introduction of experience rating may increase long term employment. Moreover, it unambiguously increases welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 663

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
unemployment insurance
labour markets
implicit contracts

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fath, Julia
Fuest, Clemens
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fath, Julia
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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