Arbeitspapier

Temporary Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance: Is Experience Rating Desirable?

This paper explores how the introduction of an experience rated system of unemployment insurance affects employment and welfare in a model where implicit contracts between firms and workers give rise to wage rigidities and unemployment. In the literature, it has been argued that experience rated systems of unemployment insurance may reduce long term employment as firms anticipate the higher costs of layoffs implied by experience rating. Our analysis shows that, despite the higher costs of layoffs, the introduction of experience rating may increase long term employment. Moreover, it unambiguously increases welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 663

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
unemployment insurance
labour markets
implicit contracts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Fath, Julia
Fuest, Clemens
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Fath, Julia
  • Fuest, Clemens
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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