Arbeitspapier

Competing for Foreign Direct Investments: A Real Options Approach

This paper uses the Bad News Principle to study how the ability of multinationals to shift profits by transfer pricing affects both the timing of foreign direct investment decisions and government tax policy. A main finding of the paper is that if countries compete to attract foreign direct investments, only weak conditions are needed to establish that welfare is higher when firms can postpone irreversible investments as opposed to when they cannot.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 929

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
Subject
corporate taxation
irreversibility
MNE
real options and uncertainty

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Panteghini, Paolo
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Panteghini, Paolo
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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