Arbeitspapier
Competing for Foreign Direct Investments: A Real Options Approach
This paper uses the Bad News Principle to study how the ability of multinationals to shift profits by transfer pricing affects both the timing of foreign direct investment decisions and government tax policy. A main finding of the paper is that if countries compete to attract foreign direct investments, only weak conditions are needed to establish that welfare is higher when firms can postpone irreversible investments as opposed to when they cannot.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 929
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
- Subject
-
corporate taxation
irreversibility
MNE
real options and uncertainty
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Panteghini, Paolo
Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Panteghini, Paolo
- Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2003