Selection biases in complementary R&D projects

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes selection biases in the project choice of complementary technologies that are used in combination to produce a final product. In the presence of complementary technologies, patents allow innovating firms to hold up rivals who succeed in developing other system components. This hold-up potential induces firms to preemptively claim stakes on component property rights and excessively cluster their R&D efforts on a relatively easier technology. This selection bias is persistent and robust to several model extensions. Implications for the optimal design of intellectual property rights are discussed. We also analyze selection biases that arise when firms differ in research capabilities.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3425

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
• Thema: R&D project choice ; preemptive duplication ; complementary innovations ; Industrielle Forschung ; Technologiewahl ; Bias ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Immaterialgüterrechte ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Choi, Jay Pil ; Gerlach, Heiko
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46351
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ