Arbeitspapier
Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: Acyclicity and dropping strategies
We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under the assumption that hospitals' preferences over groups of students are responsive. In this context, we study the preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the hospitals' preference profile (Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2013a) is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that the outcome of every Nash equilibrium in which each hospital plays a dropping strategy is stable.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Papers ; No. 2018-05
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Design
- Subject
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matching
stability
acyclicity
dropping strategies
Nash equilibria
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Tello, Benjamín
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Banco de México
- (where)
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Ciudad de México
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Tello, Benjamín
- Banco de México
Time of origin
- 2018