Arbeitspapier
A Comment on The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle (2023)
Ngangoué and Schotter (2023) investigate common-probability auctions. By running an experiment, they find that, in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions is consistent with the Nash equilibrium. We reproduce their results in R, conduct robustness checks on how their sample was constructed, and consider possible heterogeneity. We confirm their documented qualitative results.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: I4R Discussion Paper Series ; No. 74
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Eissa, Yasmine
Rosmer, Paul
Yap, Luther
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Institute for Replication (I4R)
- (where)
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s.l.
- (when)
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2023
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Eissa, Yasmine
- Rosmer, Paul
- Yap, Luther
- Institute for Replication (I4R)
Time of origin
- 2023