Arbeitspapier

A Comment on The Common-Probability Auction Puzzle (2023)

Ngangoué and Schotter (2023) investigate common-probability auctions. By running an experiment, they find that, in contrast to the substantial overbidding found in common-value auctions, bidding in strategically equivalent common-probability auctions is consistent with the Nash equilibrium. We reproduce their results in R, conduct robustness checks on how their sample was constructed, and consider possible heterogeneity. We confirm their documented qualitative results.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: I4R Discussion Paper Series ; No. 74

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eissa, Yasmine
Rosmer, Paul
Yap, Luther
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for Replication (I4R)
(where)
s.l.
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eissa, Yasmine
  • Rosmer, Paul
  • Yap, Luther
  • Institute for Replication (I4R)

Time of origin

  • 2023

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