Arbeitspapier

Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games

This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on (i) a model where firms invest so as to increase consumers' reservation prices, based upon Cellini and Lambertini (CEJOR, 2003); and (ii) a model where firms compete to increase their respective market shares, based upon Leit- mann and Schmitendorf (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1978).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 535

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Zeitkonsistenz
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Dynamisches Spiel

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2005

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4755
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cellini, Roberto
  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Leitmann, George
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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