Arbeitspapier
Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games
This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on (i) a model where firms invest so as to increase consumers' reservation prices, based upon Cellini and Lambertini (CEJOR, 2003); and (ii) a model where firms compete to increase their respective market shares, based upon Leit- mann and Schmitendorf (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1978).
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 535
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Zeitkonsistenz
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Dynamisches Spiel
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2005
- DOI
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doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4755
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cellini, Roberto
- Lambertini, Luca
- Leitmann, George
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2005