Arbeitspapier
An experiment on experimental instructions
In this paper we treat instructions as an experimental variable. Using a public good game, we study how the instructions' format affects the participants' understanding of the experiment, their speed of play and their experimental behavior. We show that longer instructions do not significantly improve the subjects' understanding of the experiment; on-screen instructions shorten average decision times with respect to on-paper instructions, and requiring forced inputs reduces waiting times, in particular for the slowest subjects. Consistent with cognitive load theory, we find that short, on-screen instructions which require forced inputs improve on subjects' comprehension and familiarity with the experimental task, and they contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting the overall pattern of contributions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2011,049
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: General
Public Goods
- Thema
-
cognitive load theory
comprehension
distraction
experimental instructions
Experimentelle Ökonomik
Test
Kognition
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bigoni, Maria
Dragone, Davide
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
- (wo)
-
Jena
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
2025-03-10T11:44:13+0100
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bigoni, Maria
- Dragone, Davide
- Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
An experiment on experimental instructions
Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment
E-nstructions: Using electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
E-nstructions: A tool for electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
Replication in experimental economics: A historical and quantitative approach focused on public good game experiments
The effect of religion on cooperation and altruistic punishment: Experimental evidence from public goods experiments
A Role for Instructions
On probation: an experimental analysis
Experimental Evidence on Credit Constraints
Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons
An experimental study on social anchoring
Manifesto Coding Instructions (Second Revised Edition)
An experiment on experimental instructions
Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment
E-nstructions: Using electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
E-nstructions: A tool for electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
Replication in experimental economics: A historical and quantitative approach focused on public good game experiments
The effect of religion on cooperation and altruistic punishment: Experimental evidence from public goods experiments
A Role for Instructions
On probation: an experimental analysis
Experimental Evidence on Credit Constraints
Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons
An experimental study on social anchoring
Manifesto Coding Instructions (Second Revised Edition)
An experiment on experimental instructions
Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment
E-nstructions: Using electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
E-nstructions: A tool for electronic instructions in laboratory experiments
Replication in experimental economics: A historical and quantitative approach focused on public good game experiments
The effect of religion on cooperation and altruistic punishment: Experimental evidence from public goods experiments
A Role for Instructions
On probation: an experimental analysis
Experimental Evidence on Credit Constraints
Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments - An Experimental Framework for Comparisons
An experimental study on social anchoring