Arbeitspapier

Contingent protection as better insurance

We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail an export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1999-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
Subject
antidumping
contingent protection
insurance

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Prusa, Thomas J.
Fischer, Ronald D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
(where)
New Brunswick, NJ
(when)
1999

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Prusa, Thomas J.
  • Fischer, Ronald D.
  • Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1999

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