Arbeitspapier
Contingent protection as better insurance
We formalize the notion that GATT exceptions such as antidumping and escape clause actions can act as insurance for import competing sectors affected by adverse price shocks. We use a general equilibrium model with several import competing sectors and assume incomplete markets so that agents cannot contract insurance. We show that these measures are superior to uniform tariffs as insurance mechanisms. Moreover, we demonstrate that the optimal uniform policy may involve a tariff at all, but rather might entail an export tax. We also show that a tax cum subsidy policy (i.e., taxing all sectors in order to subsidize the shocked sector) improves welfare.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 1999-02
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Subject
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antidumping
contingent protection
insurance
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Prusa, Thomas J.
Fischer, Ronald D.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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New Brunswick, NJ
- (when)
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1999
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Prusa, Thomas J.
- Fischer, Ronald D.
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1999