Arbeitspapier

Price taking equilibrium in club economies with multiple memberships and unbounded club sizes

This paper develops a model of an economy with clubs where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where there may be ever increasing returns to club size. Clubs may be large, as large as the total agent set. The main condition required is that sufficient wealth can compensate for memberships in larger and larger clubs. Notions of price taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions require that there is a small cost, called a communication cost, of deviating from a given outcome. With some additional standard sorts of assumptions on preferences, we demonstrate that, given communication costs parameterized by ε > 0, for all sufficiently large economies, the core is non-empty and contains states of the economy that are in the core of the replicated economy for all replications (Edgeworth states of the economy). Moreover, for any given economy, every state of the economy that is in the core for all replications of that economy can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium with communication costs. Together these two results imply that, given the communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies there exists Edgeworth states of the economy and every Edgeworth state can be supported as a price-taking equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 513

Classification
Wirtschaft
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Public Goods
Subject
Competitive pricing, Clubs, Local public goods, Hedonic coalitions, Edgeworth, Tiebout hypothesis, Core
Preiswettbewerb
Klubtheorie
Lokales Öffentliches Gut
Institutioneller Wettbewerb
Core
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Allouch, Nizar
Wooders, Myrna Holtz
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics
(where)
London
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Allouch, Nizar
  • Wooders, Myrna Holtz
  • Queen Mary University of London, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2004

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