Artikel
Characterizing the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs with unequal discounting
We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 691-717 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Subject
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Repeated games
unequal discounting
imperfect monitoring
folk theorem
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sugaya, Takuo
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
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New Haven, CT
- (when)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE1425
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Sugaya, Takuo
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2015
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