Arbeitspapier

Opportunistic Termination

If a seller delivers a good non-conforming to contract, European and US warranty law allows consumers to choose between some money transfer and termination. Termination rights are, however, widely criticized, mainly for fear that the buyer may use non-conformity as a pretext for getting rid of a contract he no longer wants. We show that this possibility of 'opportunistic termination' might actually have positive effects. Under some circumstances, it will lead to redistribution in favour of the buyer without any loss of efficiency. Moreover, by curbing the monopoly power of the seller, a regime involving termination might increase welfare by enabling a more efficient output level in a setting with multiple buyers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 226

Classification
Wirtschaft
Contract Law
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Distribution: General
Subject
contract law
warranties
breach remedies
termination
harmonization

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Stremitzer, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2008

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13326
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13326-0
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Stremitzer, Alexander
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2008

Other Objects (12)